Social comparisons in job search by Fu, Jingcheng et al.




Accepted by Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
October 2019
Abstract
Using a laboratory experiment we examine how social comparisons affect behav-
ior in a sequential search task. In a control treatment subjects search in isolation,
while in two other treatments subjects get feedback on the search decisions and
outcomes of a partner subject. The average level and rate of decline of reservation
wages are similar across treatments. Nevertheless, subjects who are able to make
social comparisons search differently from those who search in isolation. Within a
search task we observe a reference wage effect: when a partner exits, the subject
chooses a new reservation wage which is increasing in partner income. We also ob-
serve a social comparison effect between search tasks: subjects whose partners in a
previous task searched for longer choose a higher reservation wage in the next task.
Our findings imply that the provision of social information can change job-seekers’
search behavior.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we investigate experimentally whether social comparisons affect job search.
This is motivated by the fact that job search is typically not undertaken in isolation. In-
stead, job-seekers are aware of the job search activity of friends, colleagues and acquain-
tances, and information about others’ job search successes and failures is often available.
The social nature of search introduces scope for several factors that are usually ignored
in economists’ models of job search. In particular, a considerable body of evidence from
social psychology shows that social comparisons have a powerful influence on the way
humans feel and behave (Festinger 1954). People care about their status and evaluate
this by comparing themselves with others, and people who are uncertain about what
decision to make are influenced by the observed behavior of others (Bandura & Walters
1977). Recent field and experimental studies in economics have also found social com-
parison effects in various contexts, such as labor effort provision (e.g. Abeler et al. 2010,
Angelova et al. 2012, Clark et al. 2010, Cohn et al. 2014, Gächter et al. 2012, 2013),
job satisfaction (e.g. Card et al. 2012, Clark & Oswald 1996) and choice under risk (e.g.
Friedl et al. 2014, Gamba et al. 2017, Haisley et al. 2008, Lahno & Serra-Garcia 2015,
Linde & Sonnemans 2012, Rohde & Rohde 2011, Schwerter 2019).
There is indirect evidence that social comparisons affect job search. Using survey
data, Clark (2003) finds that the unemployment rate in the social reference group is
strongly positively correlated with the self-reported well-being of the unemployed. Thus,
apparently, the unemployed feel better when they see that others around them are also
unemployed. If this reduces the motivation to exit unemployment in areas with high
unemployment it may contribute to regional variation in unemployment rates. More
generally, social comparison effects may contribute to findings, such as those of Marmaros
& Sacerdote (2002), that search outcomes are correlated within groups of individuals who
interact.
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Social comparison effects on job search can arise for a variety of reasons. One reason is
that job-seekers may have distributional preferences, i.e. they care about both their own
income and their income relative to others. There is extensive evidence that interper-
sonal comparisons can influence individuals’ sense of well-being (Frank 1985, Loewenstein
et al. 1989). Indeed, a large literature has emerged studying the impact of relative wage
concerns on labor market outcomes (Akerlof & Yellen 1990, Frank 1984). As a conse-
quence, economists have developed formal models incorporating distributional concerns
into individual preferences. Using a prominent example of such a model (Fehr & Schmidt
1999) and applying it to a job-search context, we show that the reservation wages of job-
seekers with distributional preferences will be influenced by the wages other job-seekers
have accepted.
A second reason that social comparisons may affect job search stems from learning.
There is a large literature empirically supporting the idea that people learn from each
other in complex environments (see Manski 2000). Even if offer processes are independent,
and even if job-seekers care only about their own narrowly-defined self-interest, in an
environment where weighing up the attractiveness of a wage offer requires comparing it
with a dynamic lottery, a job-seeker may be uncertain about whether it is worth accepting
the wage offer. Whether others have accepted or rejected similar offers may then influence
their decision. For example, if job-seekers observe others rejecting offers, this may lead
them to reject similar offers.1
While field data offers ample evidence that social context matters because agents’
behavior within groups is correlated, it is difficult to attribute correlated outcomes in field
data to social comparison effects because there are other ways that interaction within a
group can affect search outcomes. As noted in several theoretical and empirical studies
of labor markets, social interaction can also affect job search by influencing a job-seeker’s
1Distributional preferences and learning do not exhaust the possible mechanisms by which social
comparisons affect behavior. A large literature in psychology on “social facilitation” (Zajonc 1965)
emphasize the importance of being observed for performance on a variety of tasks.
3
available options and information about those options. For instance, graduates from
the same institution may share job news and make use of alumni contacts which help
them find a job. These types of network effects, which work through changes to the offer
process (or information about the offer process) and which therefore have direct effects
on the expected costs and benefits of taking an offer or waiting, can be viewed through
the lens of standard economic theory in which job-seekers weigh up the expected costs
and benefits of search.2
To investigate whether correlated group outcomes can arise from social comparisons,
we use an experimental approach. Specifically, we create an experimental environment
where network effects are absent, allowing us to identify pure social comparison effects
on job search. In our view, observing pure social comparison effects in this setting is
highly suggestive that social comparison effects will matter more generally. Of course,
this does not provide information about the relative strength of network effects and social
comparison effects in any given field setting.
Our framework for examining whether social comparisons affect job search is a se-
quential search decision experiment. This is based on McCall’s (1970) “Basic Search
Paradigm” in which searchers receive a wage-offer from a distribution and decide whether
to accept it, receiving this wage in each remaining period, or reject it and wait for another
offer. A long-established experimental literature has studied the sequential search task
and its variants. Early studies compared individual behavior with optimal search rules
and alternative heuristics (Schotter & Braunstein 1981, Braunstein & Schotter 1982, Hey
2There is a large empirical literature about how individuals use networks to collect information in
order to find jobs and how search outcomes are influenced by social connections. According to an overview
by Ioannides & Loury (2004), the literature finds that the use of networks in job search is widespread and
generally productive, as it increases the job-finding rate and improves the quality of the match. These
findings are reinforced by a number of more recent studies (e.g. Cingano & Rosolia 2012, Dustmann
et al. 2016, Cappellari & Tatsiramos 2015, Brown et al. 2016). A number of studies have developed
theoretical frameworks for analyzing the effects of social networks on job search (e.g. Calvó-Armengol &
Jackson 2004, Galenianos 2013, Horváth 2014). The current study suggests that social comparison effects
offer an additional (and overlooked) explanation for the empirical phenomenon that search outcomes are
correlated within social networks.
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1982, 1987, Oaxaca & Cox 1989, 1992) and more recent work has focused on behavioral
explanations for deviations from theoretical predictions (Kogut 1990, Sonnemans 1998,
Schunk 2009, Schunk & Winter 2009, Brown et al. 2011). A feature of all of this literature
is that the search decisions are made in isolation. We extend this literature by adding a
social context to the search task.
We do this by varying across treatments the feedback given to subjects about the search
decisions and outcomes of others. In a control Isolated treatment subjects conduct the
search task in isolation. They receive no information about others’ search decisions or
outcomes. In two other treatments, subjects are randomly and anonymously paired and
receive feedback on their partner’s search decisions and outcomes as they conduct the
search task. In the Partner treatment subjects observe their partner’s income, whereas
in the Partner-Offer treatment, they are also informed of the offers rejected by their
partner. In all treatments the subjects are given full information about the stochastic
offer process, and the earnings of a subject depend only on how they react to their own
offers, and are independent of the decisions and earnings of other subjects. Thus, for
a fully rational self-interested subject, feedback about a partner’s search decisions and
outcomes is irrelevant.
In our Isolated treatment, in line with the long-established literature, average reserva-
tion wages are lower than the expected-earnings maximizing benchmark, and reservation
wages decline within the search task. In the Partner and Partner-Offer treatments we ob-
serve similar average levels and rates of decline of reservation wages, but we also observe
that subjects systematically respond to feedback about their partner’s search outcomes.
In the Partner and Partner-Offer treatments, when a subject observes their partner
accepting a low wage they reduce their reservation wage more than they otherwise would,
while if they observe their partner accepting a high wage they reduce their reservation
wage less than they otherwise would.
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We show that these results are qualitatively consistent with predictions from a model
based on Fehr & Schmidt’s (1999) model of inequity aversion, in which job-seekers care
about earnings differentials as well as their own earnings. To this extent, our results
complement findings of “behindness aversion” from studies of social comparison effects
on risk-taking (Lahno & Serra-Garcia 2015, Schmidt et al. 2015, Schwerter 2019).
The Partner-Offer treatment also allows us to see whether offers rejected by the partner
affect reservation wages. These offers do not directly affect partner income, but do afford
information about the partner’s reservation wage. We find that rejected offers do not
influence the reservation wage, which suggests the within-task social comparison effects
do not arise because job-seekers simply attempt to copy their partner’s reservation wage.
This contrasts with evidence of imitative behavior from risk-taking studies (e.g. Lahno &
Serra-Garcia 2015). We do, however see some evidence of social learning across repeated
search tasks. In particular, subjects who observe their previous partner searching for
longer increase their reservation wage (hence their own expected search duration) in the
next task.
In summary, our experiment reproduces the qualitative findings of previous studies that
have focused on individual decision-making in isolated search environments. In addition,
in a first experiment studying this task in a social context, we find systematic social
comparison effects. Some of these effects are consistent with those predicted by a simple
model of distributional preferences, and in addition we find social feedback influences
learning across repeated tasks.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review the (sepa-
rate) relevant literatures on search experiments and social comparisons. In Section 3 we
describe our experimental design and procedure, and in Section 4 we present our results.
Section 5 offers a discussion and some concluding comments in which we discuss the




The sequential search model (McCall 1970) provides a tractable framework to analyze
search decisions. The model assumes that a job-seeker receives one wage offer per period
of search, where offers are independently drawn from a stationary and non-degenerate
distribution, with a fixed outside option (typically a per-period unemployment benefit
minus search cost). If the job-seeker accepts an offer they exit search and receive this
wage for all future periods. If they reject the offer they wait for another offer in the
next period. It is assumed that the time horizon is infinite and the job-seeker maximizes
expected discounted utility. The optimal decision is to accept any offer above or equal
to a critical value (the reservation wage), which is constant over periods, and to continue
with search otherwise.
Early experimental studies by Schotter & Braunstein (1981, 1982) and Hey (1987),
examine how subjects search in a lab environment based on this basic search paradigm.
Other studies have investigated variants of the model, such as using a fixed time horizon
(Oaxaca & Cox 1989, 1992), imperfect information about the offer distribution (Hey 1981,
1982, Moon & Martin 1990, 1992, 1996, Cox & Oaxaca 2000), heterogeneous search ability
(Falk et al. 2009b,a) and variable search costs (Harrison & Morgan 1990, McGee & McGee
2016).
Previous experiments consistently show that subjects tend to (i) search too little and
accept lower offers compared to the risk-neutral prediction, and (ii) reduce their reserva-
tion wages over the course of a sequential search task. Some behavioral theories have been
proposed as explanations for these findings and have been tested in the laboratory. Stud-
ies suggest that the sunk-cost fallacy (Kogut 1990, Sonnemans 1998, 2000), loss and risk
aversion preferences combined with bounded rationality (Schunk 2009, Schunk & Winter
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2009, Soetevent & Bruzikas 2016) and subjective costs of uncertain waiting time (Brown
et al. 2011) all contribute to these regular departures from the theoretical predictions.
Some experiments repeat the search task, allowing investigation of how behavior changes
with experience, yet findings about learning effects are mixed. Kogut (1990) is the first
experiment which repeats the search task within subject to allow for experience effects.
With a small sample of subjects who conduct a series of repeated search tasks, he iden-
tifies a significant learning effect (i.e. search duration increases when subjects become
more experienced) for half of the subjects. Sonnemans (1998) offers a more systematic
examination of learning, showing that among subjects who repeat the search task many
times, experimentation with different search strategies decreases with experience and
search efficiency increases with experience. With fewer repetitions, Brown et al. (2011)
find no significant learning effects.
All of these studies focus on individual decision-making, and exclude any social inter-
action. As far as we are aware the only experimental study embedding the basic search
task in a social context is Ibanez et al. (2009), although their focus is rather different
from ours. They examine whether search outcomes are improved if decisions are made by
a group instead of an individual, finding that decisions made by groups are indistinguish-
able from individual decisions. Our focus instead is on whether an individual’s search
decision is influenced by social comparisons.
2.2 Social Comparison Effects
We define social comparison effects to be the causal effect on an individual’s decision
from observing other individuals’ independent decisions and outcomes. In the context
of job search, independence means that the job-seeker’s offer process and earnings are
not directly affected by other job-seekers’ decisions and outcomes. We are particularly
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interested in two mechanisms for social comparisons which are relevant in the context of
job search: distributional preferences and learning.
Distributional preferences have been frequently proposed as an explanation for social
comparison effects. In the literature on individual risk-taking, several recent experimental
studies have shown that individual choices are sensitive to the choices/earnings of other
subjects even when subjects have no direct effect on each others’ earnings (e.g. Schmidt
et al. 2015, Linde & Sonnemans 2012, Lahno & Serra-Garcia 2015, Schwerter 2019).
For example, Schwerter (2019) finds that subjects are willing to take more risks when
a subject’s peer has higher income, and shows this to be consistent with a model of
loss aversion about a reference point provided by the income of the subject peer. His
model of loss aversion about a reference point provided by peer income is analogous to
Fehr & Schmidt’s (1999) model of inequity aversion where disadvantageous inequality
generates more disutility than advantageous inequality. As we show later, applying Fehr
& Schmidt’s model of distributional preferences to our laboratory setting leads to specific
reference wage effects.
Another potential source of social comparison effects is social learning. Subjects may
be uncertain about the quality of their decisions, and therefore “may seek to draw lessons
from observation of the actions chosen and outcomes experienced by others” (Manski
2000). This might manifest itself in imitation: evidence for this is provided in a number
of lab and field experiments (Lahno & Serra-Garcia 2015, Bursztyn et al. 2014, Cai et al.
2009, Conley & Udry 2010, Cai et al. 2015). For example, in a lab experiment Lahno and
Serra-Garcia vary whether subjects can condition a simple lottery choice on the lottery
choice or the lottery allocation of a peer. In both cases they observe imitative behavior,
but to a far greater extent when peer choices are observed. They conclude that choices
of the peer matter, above and beyond their direct impact on payoffs, and peer effects
in risk-taking cannot only be explained by concerns about relative payoffs. In a field
experiment, Bursztyn et al. study how investors’ choices depend on information about
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how their friends invested. They find significant peer effects, and emphasize that both
social utility and social learning mechanisms make a significant contribution to these.
Our paper is the first to investigate the relevance of distributional preferences and
learning in a search task in which social comparisons are possible. In comparison with
the literature on social comparisons in risk-taking, our task is more complex and involves
a sequence of decisions which may be affected by the sequence of decisions and outcomes
of a partner. We describe this task in the next section.
3 Experimental Design
3.1 The basic search task
We start by describing the search task which is common to all three treatments. To mimic
the stationary, infinite horizon structure of the basic search paradigm, we use a random
termination method, whereby the search task terminates after each period with a constant
probability. The continuation probability plays the same role as the discount factor in
the infinite horizon model: a subject maximizing expected earnings should use the same
(constant) reservation wage as an infinitely-lived risk-neutral agent with a discount factor
equal to the continuation probability.3
The search task consists of a sequence of periods. In the first period, subjects choose
a reservation wage. This is an integer between 0 and 1000. Subjects then receive an
offer, randomly drawn from a discrete uniform distribution over 1 to 1000. The offer
is automatically accepted if it is greater than or equal to the reservation wage, and
3Random termination has been used extensively to mimic infinite-horizon games. See, for example,
Dal Bó & Fréchette (2017). The only other search experiment of which we are aware which uses random
termination is Brown et al. (2011). Brown et al. show that the use of random termination produces very
similar results to a methodology which explicitly discounts the value of wage offers by the elapsed search
time at which they are received.
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rejected otherwise.4 If the offer is accepted, subjects receive that wage as (points) income
in all subsequent periods, receive no further offers and make no further decisions for
the remainder of that sequence. If the offer is rejected, their income from the current
period is zero. At the end of the period, subjects receive feedback which varies across
the treatments, as we will discuss in the next subsection. The sequence continues with
probability 0.95. If the sequence continues, subjects who have not accepted an offer
are required to enter another reservation wage and the process repeats. At the end of
the sequence, subjects are informed of their points earnings from the sequence, which
is simply the sum of points earnings from all periods in the sequence. The information
received at the end of each sequence does not vary across treatments.
Subjects complete 10 sequences, each sequence having the same structure described
above. All offers are independent draws across subjects, periods and sequences. At the
end of the tenth sequence one sequence is randomly chosen for each session and points
earnings from this sequence are used to determine subjects’ monetary earnings. Subjects
receive a show-up fee of 5.00 GBP plus additional earnings from the chosen sequence,
converted at a rate of 3,000 points = 1.00 GBP. All random draws (wage offers, sequence
termination, sequence used for payment) were conducted during the session using the
Z-tree random number generator.
All the information above is described carefully to subjects in the instructions which
were handed out to subjects and read out at the beginning of the experiment. After
reading out the instructions, control questions were given to ensure that subjects under-
4Subjects are required to enter the reservation wage within 15 seconds. If they do not enter a
reservation wage within this time, this period’s offer is rejected. The time-out rule does not seem to
be binding in the great majority of cases. The average decision time of a search period is 3.8 seconds
(standard deviation 1.9 seconds). The median decision time is 3 seconds, and 95% of the decisions are
entered in under 8 seconds. The time restriction forces subjects to complete a period at roughly the
same time, facilitating the synchronization of feedback. In the experimental instructions we refer to the
reservation wage as a “minimum acceptable offer”; see instructions in Appendix A for details. We have
subjects enter reservation wages rather than make binary accept/reject decisions in order to obtain more
information about their search strategy. This technique was first applied in search tasks by Oaxaca &
Cox (1992).
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stood essential information about the search environment. The session did not start until
all subjects had correctly answered all control questions. See Appendix A for a copy of
instructions and control questions.
3.2 Treatments
To allow us to study the effect of social comparison, we manipulate across treatments
the feedback received by subjects at the end of each period. In the simplest Isolated
treatment, the feedback received by subjects in each period consists only of information
on their own offer, whether it is accepted, the resulting per-period income and their
accumulated earnings across all periods in that sequence. In the Partner and Partner-
Offer treatments subjects are randomly re-paired at the beginning of each sequence. The
random termination of sequences, which is implemented independently for each subject in
the Isolated treatment, is implemented independently at the pair level in the Partner and
Partner-Offer treatments. In all three treatments, offers are independent across subjects
and an additional control question is added in the Partner and Partner-Offer treatments
to ensure that subjects understand that own and partner offers are drawn independently.
In the Partner treatment, subjects are additionally shown their partner’s income at the
end of each period. They are therefore aware whether their partner has accepted an offer
or not, and the amount of that offer if it was accepted. The Partner treatment allows for
relatively little social feedback because subjects only learn their partner’s income each
period. Subjects whose partner has an income of zero cannot tell whether this is because
their partner has a high reservation wage, or because their partner received low offers.
This also means that there is relatively little within-sequence variation in the feedback
received. The partner’s per-period income is either zero (meaning the partner has not
yet accepted an offer) or it is constant across periods.
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In the Partner-Offer treatment, subjects again receive information about partner in-
come at the end of a period. In addition, subjects are also shown the offer made to
their partner, and whether or not their partner accepted or rejected that offer. Thus the
Partner-Offer treatment allows for more feedback and more within-sequence variation. It
also allows us to test whether feedback on rejected offers, as well as income, affects search
behavior.5
The main features of the design are summarized in Table 1. Each session consisted of
12 subjects. We conducted six sessions for each treatment. No subject participated in
more than one session.
Table 1: Treatment Design
Isolated Partner Partner-Offer
Sessions 6 6 6
Subjects per session 12 12 12
Sequences per subject 10 10 10
Paired subjects No Yes Yes
Mutual feedback on
Offer No No Yes
Income No Yes Yes
3.3 Discussion of the design
The Isolated treatment provides a benchmark which we can compare to the existing re-
sults from experimental analyses of search, all of which study decisions made in isolation.
In this setting, expected points earnings are maximized by choosing a constant reserva-
tion wage r∗ = 725 (see Appendix B.1). This is also the optimal reservation wage in the
Partner and Partner-Offer treatments if subjects care only about expected earnings.6 If
5See Figure A1 in Appendix A for an illustration of the feedback screens seen by subjects in our three
treatments.
6If a subject is risk averse, the level of the optimal reservation wage will change, but will still be
constant across periods, and will still be the optimal reservation wage regardless of which treatment the
subject is in.
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social comparisons matter, the optimal reservation wage in the Partner and Partner-Offer
treatments may differ from the Isolated treatment.
There are several ways to model how social comparisons may affect behavior. Here
we consider the implications of allowing individual preferences to depend on own and
other earnings. Such distributional preferences will affect the optimal reservation wage.7
Specifically, following Fehr & Schmidt (1999), we assume that subject i dislikes income
differences, as represented by the period utility function
uit(yit, yjt) = yit − α
(




max{yit, yjt} − yjt
)
, (1)
where yit denotes i’s period t income, yjt denotes the period t income of i’s partner, α is
the marginal disutility from disadvantageous inequality and β is the marginal disutility
from advantageous inequality.
If i’s partner has exited with an income of yjt = y, the optimal reservation wage r∗i (y)
can be shown to be a decreasing function of the partner’s income if the partner has
accepted a low wage, and an increasing function if the partner has accepted a high wage
(see Appendix B.2 for details). We plot the optimal reservation wage function in Figure 1
for five sets of (α, β), chosen based on the assumptions made in Fehr & Schmidt (1999)
i.e. 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 and α ≥ β. We observe that if the partner has accepted an offer of 0, i
cannot earn less than the partner, and so period utility given by (1) is linear in i’s own
income yit and expected utility is maximized with the expected earnings maximizing r∗.
If the partner has accepted an offer of 1,000, i cannot earn more than the partner, period
utility is again linear in yit and expected utility is maximized with r∗. If the partner
accepts an offer in between, period utility as a function of yit has a kink, analogous to
loss aversion with a social reference point, which depresses the optimal reservation wage.
7Schwerter (2019) and Linde & Sonnemans (2012) take a similar approach to analyze the effect of
social reference points on risk taking in a static risk choice task.
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Figure 1: Optimal reservation wage for i after j exits with y: r∗i (y)


















Notes: (α, β) for each curve is given by the legend; the horizontal dotted line indicates the
expected earnings maximizing r∗ = 725; the kink point of r∗i (y) lies on the 45-degree line.
To identify the relevant portion of the reservation wage function, we need to analyze the
dynamic game where both i and j are still searching. Identifying the equilibrium initial
reservation wage requires assumptions about both subjects’ preferences and what they
know about each other’s preferences. For tractability, we assume subjects have identical
preferences and this is common knowledge. In Appendix B.2 we show that the initial
equilibrium reservation wage lies above the kink point of the r∗i (y) function. This implies
that a subject never accepts a wage below the kink point and so in equilibrium only the
positively-sloped part of the reservation wage function is relevant in Figure 1.
The initial reservation wage is very close to the expected earnings maximizing reserva-
tion wage r∗ and remains constant until one of the subjects accepts an offer (i.e. rejected
offers have no effect on reservation wages). If the partner exits, the subject adopts a
new, constant reservation wage. The new reservation wage is increasing in the partner’s
accepted offer, but in expectation is lower than the initial reservation wage. We refer to
the positive relationship between a partner’s income and the subject’s reservation wage
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as a reference wage effect.
To test for this reference wage effect in our experimental data we examine the change
in the reservation wage within sequences. We examine how the reservation wage changes
following the partner’s exit, and whether this change is moderated by the partner’s in-
come. The change in the reservation wage is predicted to be the same in both the Partner
and Partner-Offer treatments, while the Isolated treatment provides a natural placebo
test.
Within-sequence social comparison effects can also arise from a desire to imitate the
partner’s decision. In the Partner and Partner-Offer treatments, the feedback allows the
subjects to make (limited) inferences about their partner’s reservation wage.8 If they
observe the partner accept an offer they would have rejected, they can infer that their
partner had a lower reservation wage. If the subject only desires to imitate their partner,
they should reduce their reservation wage, and their new reservation wage will be no
greater than the partner’s accepted offer. In the Partner-Offer treatment there is an
additional scenario that would induce an imitative subject to change their reservation
wage. If the subject observes the partner reject an offer they would have accepted, they
can infer that their partner had a higher reservation wage. Thus they should increase
their reservation wage, and their new reservation wage will be no smaller than the rejected
offer.
The reference wage effect and the imitation effect are largely observationally equivalent,
and consequently difficult to disentangle. However, with our design, the Partner-Offer
treatment offers a testable difference: the rejected offers of partners have no impact
according to the reference wage effect, whereas they have a positive impact according to
the imitation effect.
8We do not directly reveal subjects’ reservation wages to their partners. This reflects the fact that,
in real job search environments, job-seekers do not typically observe their peers’ reservation wages, but
they often do observe their peers’ search outcomes (as in the Partner treatment) or the offers their peers
receive (as in the Partner-Offer treatment).
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The fact that we have repeated sequences also allows us to test for an effect of social
feedback across sequences. In the Isolated treatment, subjects can learn about how their
own strategies affect sequence earnings and, based on prior literature (see Section 2.1),
experience from earlier sequences may improve search efficiency in later sequences. In
the social feedback treatments, the additional information about the partner’s strategies
and income might be expected to enhance this process. We therefore examine whether
previous partner income and search duration affect the subject’s choice of reservation
wage in the next sequence.
4 Results
216 subjects who were recruited through ORSEE (Greiner 2015) participated in the 18
sessions. None of the subjects had participated in a search experiment before. All ses-
sions lasted for approximately 50 minutes, and earnings averaged 10.11GBP per subject
inclusive of the show-up fee.9 The experiment was computerized using the z-Tree pro-
gram (Fischbacher 2007) and conducted in the CeDEx laboratory at the University of
Nottingham in March and April 2015 and March 2016. Subjects were randomly as-
signed into Isolated, Partner and Partner-Offer treatments. Observable characteristics
are similar across the treatments, as shown in Table 2. The differences in proportions
are insignificant according to pooled chi-square tests (p-values are reported in the last
column).
We observe 2,160 sequences of search (3 treatments × 6 sessions × 12 subjects ×
10 sequences), which contain 4,749 decision-making periods.10 5.79% of sequences were
9The use of random termination can lead to very long sequences. However, sessions are booked for 90
minutes and no session lasted for more than 60 minutes. The realized average sequence length is 20.88
periods with the standard deviation of 20.61, and the longest sequence lasted for 179 periods.
10In 7 periods, the subject passed the 15-second time limit and consequently the offer was rejected.
This happened to 6 different subjects, 1 in the Isolated, 1 in the Partner and 4 in the Partner-Offer
treatment.
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censored, which means the subject was still searching when the sequence was terminated
by the computer and no offer was accepted in that sequence.
Table 2: Observable characteristics of subjects across treatments
Treatment Isolated Partner Partner-Offer p-value from
χ2 test
Female 45 (62.5%) 44 (61.11%) 49 (68.06%) 0.656
Postgraduate 6 (8.33%) 6 (8.33%) 6 (8.33%) 1.000
Field of study
Science 34 (47.22%) 37 (51.39%) 39 (54.17%) 0.703
Social Science 30 (41.67%) 22 (30.56%) 22 (30.56%) 0.268
Arts 8 (11.11%) 13 (18.06%) 11 (15.28%) 0.498
Notes: Sciences include Engineering and Medicine and Health Sciences. Double
majors are classified as Sciences if a science major is combined with another
major, or as Social Sciences if a social science major is combined with arts
major.
Table 3 summarizes levels and changes in reservation wages for each treatment. It shows
that the two regularly-observed departures from the theoretical predictions discussed in
Section 2.1 are replicated in all treatment conditions of our experiment. First, in all
treatments average reservation wages are below the reservation wage of an expected
earnings maximizer (r∗ = 725). Panel (a) of Table 3 reports average initial (period
1) reservation wages of 539, 555 and 512 in the Isolated, Partner and Partner-Offer
treatments respectively, with 95% confidence intervals easily excluding r∗.11 As a result
of these low reservation wages, search spells tend to be short, on average 2.19 periods (the
distribution of search spell lengths is shown in Figure C1 in Appendix C). Subjects often
exit with an offer below r∗ (37.45% of the sequences in our sample). Average reservation
wages in all periods summarized in Panel (b) are slightly higher than average initial
reservation wages, mainly due to a selection effect (subjects who set lower reservation
wages tend to exit search earlier and so are under-represented in the sample), but still
significantly below r∗. This finding is consistent with the existing experimental literature.
For example, our average reservation wage is just below 80% of r∗, and a similar ratio
can be calculated from the average reported in Brown et al. (2011).
11Throughout the paper, standard errors are clustered at the session level.
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Table 3: Overview of reservation wages across treatments, pooled across sequences
Obs. Mean Std. Err. 95% C.I.
(a) Initial period
Isolated 719 538.59 23.08 (479.26 597.91)
Partner 719 555.07 40.36 (451.33 658.81)
Partner-Offer 717 512.00 10.61 (484.71 539.28)
(b) Overall average
Isolated 1, 575 586.85 14.51 (549.56 624.15)
Partner 1, 587 585.42 29.03 (510.80 660.04)
Partner-Offer 1, 580 543.10 15.01 (504.53 581.68)
(c) Within sequence per-period change
Isolated 855 −26.50 4.53 (−38.15 −14.85)
Partner 867 −29.81 3.65 (−39.18 −20.43)
Partner-Offer 859 −32.47 3.24 (−40.81 −24.13)
Notes: 7 periods in which the subject fails to enter a decision
before the time limit (0.1% of active periods) are excluded from
the summary.
Second, in all treatments we consistently observe a declining reservation wage within
sequences. Panel (c) of Table 3 shows that the average per-period change in the reser-
vation wage is −27, −30 and −32 in the Isolated, Partner and Partner-Offer treatments.
The 95% confidence intervals all exclude zero. Figure 2 shows this graphically by plotting
the average reservation wage across periods, conditional on search length.12 For all sub-
samples, the reservation wage is declining in all treatments. This finding is also consistent
with the existing experimental literature, see for example Braunstein & Schotter (1982)
and Brown et al. (2011).13
At an aggregate level, we find strong similarities across treatments. Neither initial
period reservation wages, average reservation wages across all periods, or the within
sequence per-period changes in reservation wages are significantly different across treat-
12We condition on search length because subjects with higher reservation wages will tend to have
longer search durations. If we did not condition on search length, the average reservation wage would
increase across periods as subjects with lower reservation wages exit faster, even if subjects have constant
reservation wages.
13Indirect evidence of the declining reservation wage also comes from studies which do not elicit a
reservation wage but allow subjects to recall offers. In these studies, many subjects exercise the option
to recall offers that have been previously rejected (Hey 1987, Kogut 1990).
19
Figure 2: Reservation wage by search length
(a) Isolated treatment
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Notes: N in each figure refers to the number of sequences with that search length. To ensure
that sequences are not selected into the subsamples by random termination, 106 sequences
(4.91%) which are censored due to termination before the fifth period are not included in the
summary. The sequences in which the subject passed the time limit for the initial period are
also excluded.
ments.14
However, in the next two sections we analyze the data at a more disaggregated level
and show that subjects systematically respond to social feedback in our Partner and
Partner-Offer treatments, both within and between sequences.
14Treating each subject as an independent observation (N = 3 × 6 × 12), a Kruskal-Wallis rank test
gives p = 0.177 for equality of initial period reservation wages, p = 0.139 for equality of overall average
reservation wages and p = 0.764 for equality of per-period change in reservation wages.
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4.1 The impact of social feedback within sequences
To test whether subjects are responding to their partner’s search feedback, we compare the
decisions made before and after feedback is received. To do this, we focus on the difference
between the reservation wage in period t and the reservation wage in the previous period
t − 1. Search feedback from the partner is characterized by two key variables. First,
an indicator of whether subject i’s partner j accepted an offer in the previous period.
Second, the value of the offer received by j in the previous period. These variables are
only defined in periods in which subject i is still searching at t, and their partner j was still
searching at t − 1, and therefore the sample used in the analysis in this section consists
of those observations from periods t in which the subject’s partner was still searching
at t − 1. In the Isolated treatment subjects do not have a partner, we therefore create
artificial partners by pairing subjects randomly. The artificial partners do not provide
any feedback, and hence are used for placebo tests.
There are 1,671 periods in the sample, which is 35% of all the decision-making periods.
The initial periods of a sequence (2,160, 45%) are excluded because no feedback from the
partner is possible. Similarly, periods in which the partner exited before t− 1 (910, 19%)
are excluded because, again, no feedback is possible at t. In addition, 8 periods (0.2%)
in which the subject timed out in the current or the previous period are also excluded.
Almost all subjects (96.76%) are included in the sample for one or more sequences (the
average is 5.28 sequences per subject), and observations are fairly evenly distributed
across sequences. The sample selection by treatment is given in Table C1 in Appendix C.
In Figure 3 we plot the correlation between the change in subject i’s reservation wage
and the value of the offer received by their partner j. We do this separately, by treatment,
for those cases where j rejected the offer (top row) and those cases where j accepted the
offer (bottom row). We separate in this way because accepted offers lead to a change in
partner’s income, whereas rejected offers do not. The sample size, the Pearson correlation
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coefficient and p-value are given at the top of each panel, and in addition we display
a scatter plot of the average change in the reservation wage and average value of the
partner’s offer for each decile of the partner’s offer (10 data points) and a linear fit. As
noted earlier, Panels (a) and (d) are placebo conditions from the Isolated treatment. Panel
(b) is also a placebo condition because there is no feedback on rejected offers in the Partner
treatment. As expected, correlations in all the placebo conditions are insignificant. The
correlation between the change in reservation wage and partner’s rejected offer is also
small and insignificant in the Partner-Offer treatment (Panel (c)). The patterns are quite
distinct in those cases in the Partner and Partner-Offer treatments where the partner
accepts the offer (Panels (e) and (f)). The change in reservation wage is significantly and
positively correlated with partner’s offer, with a correlation coefficient of 0.144 (p = 0.025)
and 0.179 (p = 0.006).
To quantitatively estimate how subjects are influenced by social comparisons, we esti-
mate the following model for each treatment:






is,t−1 + λt + θs + ηi + ϵis,t (2)
The subscripts i, s and t are identifiers for, respectively, subject, sequence and period.
The dependent variable is the change in the reservation wage relative to the previous
period. The explanatory variables are an indicator for whether the partner accepted
their offer in period t − 1 (aj = 1 for acceptance and 0 for rejection), the value of the
partner’s offer in period t − 1 (wj) and the interaction of the acceptance indicator and
the offer, which is the period t− 1 income of the partner. We control for period (λt) and
sequence (θs) fixed effects, and allow for subject random effects (ηi).
In the Isolated treatment aj and wj are not observed, so changes in the reservation
wage must be independent of these variables by design, and so β1, β2 and β3 should be
zero. In the Partner treatment aj is observed but wj is only observed if aj = 1, so β3
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Figure 3: Correlation between changes in reservation wage and partner’s offer








































































Notes: We separate the observations in each treatment by the decision of the partner (or placebo
partner for the Isolated treatment). The Pearson correlation between partner’s offer and changes
in reservation wage, and unadjusted, significance level are given at the top of each panel. The
panels display the binned scatter plots: for each decile of partner’s offers in the subsample, we
plot the average change in the reservation wage and the average of partner’s offer. Also shown is
the fitted linear relationship among the 10 dots. Details of this method can be found in Stepner
(2013).
should be zero. In the Partner-Offer treatment, both aj and wj are observed in every
period and so β1, β2 and β3 might all be different from zero if subjects respond to this
information.
Estimates of equation (2) are reported in Table 4.15 On average across all periods and
sequences in the sample, subjects reduced their reservation wage by about 30 points per
period. This is very similar to the per-period decline reported in Table 3 and Figure 2. In
the Isolated treatment, as expected, β̂1, β̂2 and β̂3 are all small and insignificantly different
from zero. In the Partner and Partner-Offer treatments, however, β̂1 is significant and
negative, indicating that a subject whose partner exits in the previous period lowers
15The results are robust to alternative specifications, such as dropping the period and sequence dum-
mies, or the addition of controls for observable characteristics, see Table D1 in Appendix D.
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their reservation wage by 60–70 points more than they otherwise would. β̂2 is significant
and positive in the Partner and Partner-Offer treatments, showing that the value of the
accepted offer is also relevant. A subject’s reservation wage is increasing with the offer
accepted by the partner; the slope is approximately 0.1 (β̂2 + β̂3). By comparison, in our
analysis of job-seekers with Fehr-Schmidt preferences the slope varies between 0.13 and
0.34 depending on preference parameters (see Table B1 in Appendix B.2 for details).
The exit and income effects together imply that a subject whose partner exits may
increase or reduce their reservation wage in the next period, depending on the value of
the partner’s exit wage. Given that the average exit wage of the partner is 746 (Partner
treatment) and 718 (Partner-offer treatment), our estimates of equation (2) predict a very
small negative effect of partner exit on reservation wage. This leads to a small predicted
increase in the probability of exit in the period after a partner exits of less than 1%. This
small effect helps to explain why the average change in the reservation wage is similar in
the Isolated and social feedback treatments. By comparison, in our theoretical analysis
the remaining job-seeker’s average exit probability increases by 1% to 3% depending on
preference parameters (also see Table B1).
In contrast to the estimated effect of accepted offers (β̂2+ β̂3), offers which are rejected
appear to have no impact on subjects’ reservation wages: β̂3 is small and insignificantly
different from zero in all treatments.
These regression results reinforce the findings reported in Figure 3. First, all estimated
coefficients in the Isolated Treatment are insignificant. Second, the results reproduce the
positive correlation between the partner’s income and the change in the subject’s reser-
vation wage in the Partner and Partner-Offer treatments. Third, the results reproduce
the insignificant effect of rejected offers on reservation wages in the Partner-Offer treat-
ment. The latter two findings are qualitatively consistent with the Fehr-Schmidt model
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Table 4: Change in reservation wage between periods as a function
of partner’s offer and acceptance decision
(1) (2) (3)
Isolated Partner Partner-Offer
Mean ∆r −31.538 −30.702 −29.844
β1 j accepted offer (aj) −7.984 −71.205∗∗ −63.645∗∗∗
(22.810) (33.313) (18.923)
β2 j’s income (ajwj) 0.009 0.092∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.046) (0.027)
β3 value of j’s offer (wj) 0.0004 −0.006 −0.002
(0.019) (0.022) (0.013)
Subject random effects Yes Yes Yes
Period fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Sequence fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Number of obs. 510 578 591
Number of sessions 6 6 6
Notes: In the Isolated treatments, results are based on 10,000 repli-
cations each with a random pairing of partners. The pairing af-
fects the number of observations because whether or not feedback
is available in a particular period depends on whether the partner
has already exited. We report the average number of observations
across all replications. Standard errors clustered at the session
level are in parentheses.
analyzed in Appendix B.2.16
The second finding is also consistent with subjects inferring their partner’s reserva-
tion wage and attempt to imitate it. As noted earlier, in our setting, subjects can make
inferences about their partner’s reservation wages when they observe their partner’s in-
come. When a subject observes their partner accept an offer below their own reservation
wage they can infer that the partner’s reservation wage is lower than their own. If the
subject wishes to imitate they will lower their own reservation wage. For a fixed initial
16To test whether the estimated coefficients are different between the Isolated and social feedback
treatments, we compare the point estimates of β1, β2, and β3 from Partner and Partner-Offer treat-
ments to the distribution of those coefficients generated by the 10,000 replications of random pairings of
subjects in the Isolated treatment; the two-sided p-values are constructed as the probability of getting
more extreme coefficients from the replications. β1 is significantly smaller (more negative) in the social
treatments (p = 0.003 and 0.006 for Partner and Partner-Offer, respectively), while β2 is significantly
larger (more positive) in the social treatments (p = 0.005 and 0.007). There is no difference in the
estimates of β3 between the Isolated and social treatments (p = 0.757 and 0.932).
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own reservation wage the reduction will be larger the lower the accepted offer. However,
reservation wage imitation would also imply an analogous rejected offer effect when the
subject observes their partner reject an offer above their own reservation wage. We do
not observe such an effect in either Figure 3c or Table 4.
4.2 Impact of social feedback between sequences
We now consider whether feedback also changes reservation wages between sequences.
Recall that subjects and their partners are randomly re-paired at the end of each sequence,
and only one randomly-drawn sequence is used to determine earnings. A sequence is
therefore very much like previous sequences, and from this perspective we might expect
behavior to be similar across sequences. However, behavior might change across sequences
if subjects learn from their own outcomes and the outcomes of their partners in earlier
sequences.
In Figure 4 we plot the average period 1 reservation wage in each sequence across all
10 sequences. We use period 1 reservation wages for this comparison because reservation
wages in period 1 are not yet influenced by the within-sequence feedback documented in
the previous section. Figure 4 shows that initial reservation wages tend to increase across
sequences in all three treatments. A linear trend estimated separately for each treatment
yields a slope of 9 points (standard error 2 points, p = 0.005) per sequence in the Partner
treatment, 6 (3, p = 0.093) in the Partner-Offer treatment, and 3 (3, p = 0.227) in
the Isolated treatment. This implies that, in the Partner treatment, subjects choose a
reservation wage 16.63% higher in the final sequence compared to the first sequence. In
the Partner-Offer treatment, this increase is estimated to be 11.71%. In the Isolated
treatment, this increase is estimated to be 6.43%. However, the difference in sequence
trend between Partner and Isolated treatments is only marginally significant (p = 0.067),
and the difference between Partner-Offer and Isolated treatments is insignificant (p =
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0.499). The difference between Partner and Partner-Offer treatments is also insignificant
(p = 0.351).17 Therefore, at the aggregate level, we do not find strong evidence of
treatment differences.
During each sequence, subjects in the Partner and Partner-Offer treatments observe
their partner’s income and search duration. We therefore examine whether the change in
reservation wage between sequences is affected by social feedback in the form of previous
partner income and search duration from the previous sequence. We measure the between-
sequence change in period 1 reservation wages, ∆ris1 = ris1 − ri(s−1)1. Feedback from the
previous sequence is measured as own sequence earnings and duration of search, and
previous partner j’s sequence earnings and duration of search. An alternative measure
of income is the exit offer. Since subjects receive direct feedback on partner’s per-period
income (i.e. the exit offer), and so the exit offers might be regarded as the more salient
measure of relative “success”.
There are 1,756 subject-sequences for which we have information on ∆ris1, income
and search duration for the subject and their partner in the previous sequence, which
17The findings are robust to the inclusion of subject characteristics, reported in Table D2. Table D2
also examines sequence trends for exit period reservation wages. These are positive and significantly
different from zero in all treatments, but are higher in the social feedback treatments (and again the
difference is only significant between Partner and Isolated treatments).
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is 81.30% of all subject-sequences. We cannot calculate ∆ris1 in the first sequence for
each subject (216, 10%). We also lose a very small number of observations (4, 0.19%)
because of subjects who were timed out before they entered a value for r. Because
we require information on both i and j’s income and search duration in the previous
sequence, we also drop the pair of subject-sequences if either i or j were censored in the
previous sequence (184, 8.52%). The sample selection by treatment is given in Table C2
in Appendix C.
The model we estimate is
∆ris1 = δ0 + δ1Yi(s−1) + δ2Ti(s−1) + δ3Yj(s−1) + δ4Tj(s−1) + ϵis1 (3)
where Yj(s−1) is previous partner j income and Tj(s−1) is previous partner search duration,
both measured in sequence s− 1.
Results from estimating (3) are reported in Table 5. In the top panel, we report
estimates which use total sequence earnings as a measure of partner income, and in the
bottom panel we report estimates which use exit offer as a measure of partner income.
The estimated constant is always positive because, on average, subjects increase their
period 1 reservation wage across sequences, as shown in Figure 4. Note also that the
constant is larger in the Partner and Partner-Offer treatment. There is some evidence
that a subject’s income in the previous sequence causes them to choose a lower reservation
wage in the current sequence. This effect, measured by δ1 is always negative, but the
significance of the effect varies across treatments and according to the measure of income
used. We find more consistent evidence that longer search duration in the previous
sequence causes subjects to choose a lower reservation wage in the current sequence.
This effect, measured by δ2, is significant in all treatments and for both measures of
income.
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Table 5: Change in reservation wage between sequences as a func-
tion of previous partner’s income and search length
(1) (2) (3)
Isolated Partner Partner-Offer
(a) Income = total sequence earnings (000s points)
δ0 Constant 25.447∗∗∗ 33.672∗∗ 44.428∗∗∗
(6.846) (15.353) (15.077)
δ1 Yi(s−1) −0.050 −2.122 −1.016∗
(0.061) (1.555) (0.573)
δ2 Ti(s−1) −6.786∗∗∗ −14.618∗∗∗ −17.985∗∗∗
(0.503) (2.225) (2.711)
δ3 Yj(s−1) −0.021 1.948 0.869∗
(0.285) (1.369) (0.528)
δ4 Tj(s−1) −0.717 7.976∗ 5.118∗∗
(2.673) (4.078) (2.011)
(b) Income = exit offer (points)
δ0 Constant 21.923 66.483 85.815∗∗
(17.851) (59.067) (37.363)
δ1 Yi(s−1) −0.070∗∗∗ −0.102 −0.059∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.068) (0.022)
δ2 Ti(s−1) −5.215∗∗∗ −12.603∗∗∗ −16.928∗∗∗
(0.505) (1.460) (2.433)
δ3 Yj(s−1) 0.002 0.052
∗∗ −0.005
(0.023) (0.026) (0.033)
δ4 Tj(s−1) −1.065 6.718∗ 4.830∗∗
(2.665) (3.953) (2.205)
Subject random effects Yes Yes Yes
Number of obs. 583 580 595
Number of sessions 6 6 6
Notes: the dependent variable is the change in period 1 reservation
wage between sequence s and sequence s − 1. The social feedback
variables are standardized to have zero mean and unit standard de-
viation. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the session
level. In the Isolated treatments, results are based on 10,000 replica-
tions each with a random pairing of partners. The pairing affects the
number of observations because whether or not feedback is available
in a particular period depends on whether the partner has already
exited. We report the average number of observations across all
replications.
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Of more interest are the effects of previous partner income and search duration given
by the parameters δ3 and δ4. As expected, δ3 and δ4 are insignificantly different from zero
in the Isolated treatment where no information on partners is available. We find only
mixed evidence that previous partner income matters for the choice of reservation wage in
the current sequence. When income is measured as total sequence earnings in panel (a),
the effect is positive, small and not consistently significantly different from zero. When
income is measured as exit offer in panel (b), the effect is significant and positive in only
the Partner Treatment. The estimated effect of previous partner search duration is more
clear-cut. In both the Partner and Partner-Offer treatments δ4 is estimated to be positive
and significant in both panels. In other words, a subject who learns that their partner
in the last sequence searched for longer increases their reservation wage by more in the
next sequence.
5 Discussion and Conclusions
It is widely recognized that social interaction matters for outcomes in labor markets.
However, the existing literature has tended to focus on network effects, whereby social
networks provide additional options and information about those options. In this paper
we use an experimental setting to investigate an alternative channel for social interactions
to influence search: social comparison effects.
Our experiment employs a search task based on McCall’s (1970) canonical model of
labor market search, which offers predictions for optimal search decisions in a known
search environment. Similar search tasks have been examined in the earlier experimental
literature. To implement the stationary infinite-horizon decision-making problem, we use
a random termination method whereby subjects search with an uncertain time horizon.
In this setting, the continuation probability plays a similar role to the discount factor,
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and the strategy that maximizes expected earnings is the same constant reservation wage
that maximizes the expected discounted utility in the infinite-horizon model.
In the treatment where subjects search in isolation, the findings from the previous
literature are replicated in our search task with random termination. Subjects tend to
set lower reservation wages than is consistent with maximizing expected earnings, and
they tend to decrease reservation wages over the course of a search task.
We then consider how social comparisons affect search behavior. We conduct two
treatments in which subjects are paired and complete independent search tasks. During
the task they receive information about their partner’s search, but importantly their
decisions have no direct effect on their partner’s offer process. Thus our experiment
excludes possible network effects.
In one treatment we allow subjects to observe a partner’s income at the end of each
period. This information is available both during search and after offer acceptance;
these two states are analogous to the search and employment spells in a job-seeker’s
labor market experience. In another treatment we also allow subjects to observe offers
received by a partner. This in addition to the partner’s acceptance/rejection decision gives
additional information about the partner’s reservation wage. Such social comparisons
may affect search due to distributional preferences or learning effects.
In these novel treatments we show that social comparisons have a real impact on search
decisions. In particular, we find that when a subject observes their partner exit with a low
wage they tend to decrease their reservation wage by more than they otherwise would, and
if they observe their partner exit with a high wage they tend to decrease their reservation
wage by less than they otherwise would.
This pattern is qualitatively consistent with a reference wage effect driven by distribu-
tional preferences. In particular, applying the Fehr-Schmidt model of inequality aversion
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to our setting, an active searcher’s reservation wage increases with the income of a part-
ner over a particular range of parameter values. This finding complements the findings
from studies on social comparison effects in risk-taking, where risk-taking is influenced by
the earnings of others in a manner consistent with aversion to earning less than others.
We also find evidence of social comparison effects across repeated search sequences, in
that subjects tend to choose higher reservation wages when they observe their previous
partner searching longer.
The social comparison effects we observe imply that job-seekers who search in a social
environment will have an increased job-finding rate after their partner has found a job,
because their reservation wage declines. Thus, the difference in search duration between
partners will be smaller than in the case of two isolated job-seekers. The effects also
imply that job-seekers who search in a social environment will have positively correlated
wages even when the offer distributions they face are uncorrelated, because the partner’s
exit wage influences the remaining job-seeker’s reservation wage.
These findings suggest that observing others’ search outcomes affects search behav-
ior, even absent any network effects. The fact that job-seekers are influenced by social
comparisons and the search outcome of others may allow policy makers to use effective
low-cost interventions. For example, a community may have chronically high unemploy-
ment rates, because job-seekers in that community generally have high reservation wages
so that they are seldom exposed to the job search success of others. Presenting them with
search outcome of other job-seekers outside the community who have lower reservation
wages may induce them to lower reservation wages and increase their job-finding rates.
In such a way social comparison effects may be harnessed to alleviate community-level
unemployment.18
18Altmann et al. (2018) find, in a large-scale field experiment, that a low-cost intervention in the form
of a brochure containing information about job search and unemployment can have positive effects on
job-seekers’ employment and wages.
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Two obvious questions that arise from this study are: first, whether the social compar-
ison effects we observe are relevant to real job-search settings, and second, whether the
effects we observe have implications for other search settings. We note that the social
interaction in our experiment is very limited; the subjects in our various treatments expe-
rience a very similar environment, the only difference being limited to information about
an anonymous other. In real job search environments we expect social interaction to be
much richer. We see no reason to suppose that social comparison effects would be weaker
in the richer environment. This question could be further explored in future research
which varies the form of social interaction. We hypothesize that with richer interaction,
for example allowing communication between subjects, we would observe stronger social
comparison effects. On the second question, we note that the sequential search model
may also apply to other settings such as consumer product search, flat-hunting and even
searching for partners. In all these settings, the decisions of peers may allow for social
comparisons which affect the decision to accept or reject a particular offer. We leave such
issues to further research.
33
References
Abeler, J., Altmann, S., Kube, S. & Wibral, M. (2010), ‘Gift exchange and workers’ fair-
ness concerns: When equality is unfair’, Journal of the European Economic Association
8(6), 1299–1324.
Akerlof, G. A. & Yellen, J. L. (1990), ‘The fair wage-effort hypothesis and unemployment’,
Quarterly Journal of Economics 105(2), 255–283.
Altmann, S., Armin, F., Jäger, S. & Zimmermann, F. (2018), ‘Learning about job search:
A field experiment with job seekers in Germany’, Journal of Public Economics 164, 33
– 49.
Angelova, V., Güth, W. & Kocher, M. G. (2012), ‘Co-employment of permanently and
temporarily employed agents’, Labour Economics 19(1), 48–58.
Bandura, A. & Walters, R. H. (1977), Social learning theory, Prentice-Hall Englewood
Cliffs, NJ.
Braunstein, Y. M. & Schotter, A. (1982), ‘Labour market search: an experimental study’,
Economic Inquiry 20(1), 133–144.
Brown, M., Flinn, C. J. & Schotter, A. (2011), ‘Real time search in the laboratory and
the market’, American Economic Review 101(2), 948–974.
Brown, M., Setren, E. & Topa, G. (2016), ‘Do informal referrals lead to better
matches? evidence from a firm’s employee referral system’, Journal of Labor Eco-
nomics 34(1), 161–209.
Bursztyn, L., Ederer, F., Ferman, B. & Yuchtman, N. (2014), ‘Understanding mecha-
nisms underlying peer effects: Evidence from a field experiment on financial decision’,
Econometrica 82, 1273–1301.
Cai, H., Chen, Y. & Fang, H. (2009), ‘Observational learning: Evidence from a random-
ized natural field experiment’, American Economic Review 99(3), 864–82.
Cai, J., De Janvry, A. & Sadoulet, E. (2015), ‘Social networks and the decision to insure’,
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 7(2), 81–108.
Calvó-Armengol, A. & Jackson, M. O. (2004), ‘The effects of social networks on employ-
ment and inequality’, American Economic Review 94(3), 426–454.
Cappellari, L. & Tatsiramos, K. (2015), ‘With a little help from my friends? Quality
of social networks, job finding and job match quality’, European Economic Review
78, 55–75.
Card, D., Mas, A., Moretti, E. & Saez, E. (2012), ‘Inequality at work: The effect of peer
salaries on job satisfaction’, American Economic Review 102(6), 2981–3003.
Cingano, F. & Rosolia, A. (2012), ‘People I know: Job search and social networks’,
Journal of Labor Economics 30(2), 291–332.
34
Clark, A. E. (2003), ‘Unemployment as a social norm: Psychological evidence from panel
data’, Journal of Labor Economics 21(2), 323–351.
Clark, A. E., Masclet, D. & Villeval, M. C. (2010), ‘Effort and comparison income:
Experimental and survey evidence’, ILR Review 63(3), 407–426.
Clark, A. E. & Oswald, A. J. (1996), ‘Satisfaction and comparison income’, Journal of
Public Economics 61(3), 359 – 381.
Cohn, A., Fehr, E., Herrmann, B. & Schneider, F. (2014), ‘Social comparison and ef-
fort provision: Evidence from a field experiment’, Journal of the European Economic
Association 12(4), 877–898.
Conley, T. G. & Udry, C. R. (2010), ‘Learning about a new technology: Pineapple in
Ghana’, American Economic Review 100(1), 35–69.
Cox, J. & Oaxaca, R. (2000), ‘Good news and bad news: Search from unknown wage
offer distributions’, Experimental Economics 2, 197–225.
Dal Bó, P. & Fréchette, G. R. (2017), ‘On the determinants of cooperation in infinitely
repeated games: A survey’, Journal of Economic Literature forthcoming.
Dustmann, C., Glitz, A. & Schönberg, U. (2016), ‘Referral-based job search networks’,
Review of Economic Studies 83(2), 514–546.
Falk, A., Huffman, D. & Sunde, U. (2009a), Do I have what it takes? Equilibrium search
with type uncertainty and non-participation. IZA Discussion Paper No. 2531.
Falk, A., Huffman, D. & Sunde, U. (2009b), Self-confidence and search. IZA Discussion
Paper No. 2525.
Fehr, E. & Schmidt, K. M. (1999), ‘A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation’,
Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, 817–868.
Festinger, L. (1954), ‘A theory of social comparison processes’, Human Relations
7(2), 117–140.
Fischbacher, U. (2007), ‘z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments’,
Experimental Economics 10(2), 171–178.
Frank, R. H. (1984), ‘Are workers paid their marginal products?’, American Economic
Review 74(4), 549–571.
Frank, R. H. (1985), Choosing the right pond: Human behavior and the quest for status.,
New York: Oxford University Press.
Friedl, A., De Miranda, K. L. & Schmidt, U. (2014), ‘Insurance demand and social
comparison: An experimental analysis’, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 48(2), 97–
109.
35
Gächter, S., Nosenzo, D. & Sefton, M. (2012), ‘The impact of social comparisons on
reciprocity’, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 114(4), 1346–1367.
Gächter, S., Nosenzo, D. & Sefton, M. (2013), ‘Peer effects in pro-social behavior: So-
cial norms or social preferences?’, Journal of the European Economic Association
11(3), 548–573.
Galenianos, M. (2013), ‘Learning about match quality and the use of referrals’, Review
of Economic Dynamics 16(4), 668–690.
Gamba, A., Manzoni, E. & Stanca, L. (2017), ‘Social comparison and risk taking behav-
ior’, Theory and Decision 82(2), 221–248.
Greiner, B. (2015), ‘Subject pool recruitment procedures: organizing experiments with
ORSEE’, Journal of the Economic Science Association 1(1), 114–125.
Haisley, E., Mostafa, R. & Loewenstein, G. (2008), ‘Subjective relative income and lottery
ticket purchases’, Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 21(3), 283–295.
Harrison, G. W. & Morgan, P. (1990), ‘Search intensity in experiments’, Economic Jour-
nal 100, 478–486.
Hey, J. D. (1981), ‘Are optimal search rules reasonable? And vice versa?(And does it
matter anyway?)’, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 2(1), 47–70.
Hey, J. D. (1982), ‘Search for rules for search’, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organi-
zation 3(1), 65–81.
Hey, J. D. (1987), ‘Still searching’, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
8(1), 137–144.
Horváth, G. (2014), ‘Occupational mismatch and social networks’, Journal of Economic
Behavior & Organization 106, 442–468.
Ibanez, M., Czermak, S. & Sutter, M. (2009), ‘Searching for a better deal–on the influence
of group decision making, time pressure and gender on search behavior’, Journal of
Economic Psychology 30(1), 1–10.
Ioannides, Y. M. & Loury, L. D. (2004), ‘Job information networks, neighborhood effects,
and inequality’, Journal of Economic Literature 42(4), 1056–1093.
Kogut, C. A. (1990), ‘Consumer search behavior and sunk costs’, Journal of Economic
Behavior & Organization 14(3), 381–392.
Lahno, A. M. & Serra-Garcia, M. (2015), ‘Peer effects in risk taking: Envy or confor-
mity?’, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 50(1), 73–95.
Linde, J. & Sonnemans, J. (2012), ‘Social comparison and risky choices’, Journal of Risk
and Uncertainty 44, 45–72.
36
Loewenstein, G. F., Thompson, L. & Bazerman, M. H. (1989), ‘Social utility and deci-
sion making in interpersonal contexts’, Journal of Personality and Social psychology
57(3), 426.
Manski, C. F. (2000), ‘Economic analysis of social interactions’, Journal of Economic
Perspectives 14, 115–136.
Marmaros, D. & Sacerdote, B. (2002), ‘Peer and social networks in job search’, European
Economic Review 46, 870–879.
McCall, J. J. (1970), ‘Economics of information and job search’, Quarterly Journal of
Economics 84(1), 113–126.
McGee, A. & McGee, P. (2016), ‘Search, effort, and locus of control’, Journal of Economic
Behavior & Organization 126, 89 – 101.
Moon, P. & Martin, A. (1990), ‘Better heuristics for economic search: Experimental and
simulation evidence’, Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 3(3), 175–193.
Moon, P. & Martin, A. (1992), ‘Purchasing decisions, partial knowledge, and economic
search experimental and simulation evidence’, Journal of Behavioral Decision Making
5(4), 253–266.
Moon, P. & Martin, A. (1996), ‘The search for consistency in economic search’, Journal
of Economic Behavior & Organization 29, 311–321.
Oaxaca, R. L. & Cox, J. C. (1989), ‘Laboratory experiments with a finite horizon job
search model’, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 2, 301–329.
Oaxaca, R. L. & Cox, J. C. (1992), ‘Direct test of the reservation wage property’, Eco-
nomic Journal 102, 1423–1432.
Rohde, I. M. T. & Rohde, K. I. M. (2011), ‘Risk attitudes in a social context’, Journal
of Risk and Uncertainty 43(3), 205–225.
Schmidt, U., Friedl, A. & Lima de Miranda, K. (2015), Social comparison and gender
differences in risk taking, Technical report, Kiel Working Paper.
Schotter, A. & Braunstein, Y. M. (1981), ‘Economic search: an experimental study’,
Economic Inquiry 19, 1–25.
Schunk, D. (2009), ‘Behavioral heterogeneity in dynamic search situations: Theory and
experimental evidence’, Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 33, 1719–1738.
Schunk, D. & Winter, J. (2009), ‘The relationship between risk attitudes and heuristics in
search tasks: A laboratory experiment’, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
71(2), 347–360.
Schwerter, F. (2019), Social reference points and risk taking, Technical report, Mimeo,
University of Cologne.
37
Soetevent, A. R. & Bruzikas, T. (2016), Risk and loss aversion, price uncertainty and the
implications for consumer search. Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 16-049/VII.
Sonnemans, J. (1998), ‘Strategies of search’, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organiza-
tion 35, 309–332.
Sonnemans, J. (2000), ‘Decisions and strategies in a sequential search experiment’, Jour-
nal of Economic Psychology 21(1), 91–102.
Stepner, M. (2013), ‘BINSCATTER: Stata module to generate binned scatterplots’, Sta-
tistical Software Components, Boston College Department of Economics.
Zajonc, R. B. (1965), ‘Social facilitation’, Science 149(3681), 269–274.
38
Appendix A Experimental Instructions
[*] indicates differences across treatments.
Welcome! You are about to take part in a decision-making experiment. For partici-
pating in this experiment you will earn a show-up fee of £5. You can earn additional
money depending on your decisions, so it is important that you read these instructions
with care.
Please switch off your mobile phones. Communication with other participants is pro-
hibited during the experiment. If you violate this rule, you will be dismissed from the
experiment and you will forfeit all payments. If you have any questions, please raise your
hand. A member of the experiment team will come and answer them in private.
The experiment will consist of 10 sequences. In each sequence you can earn points.
After the completion of the experiment, the computer will randomly draw one sequence
and all participants will receive additional earnings determined by the points they earned
in that sequence. The points earned in that sequence will be converted to Pounds at the
following rate:
3,000 points = 1 Pound
At the end of the experiment this amount plus your show-up fee of £5 will be paid to
you privately in cash.
Description of a sequence
Each of the 10 sequences of the experiment has the same structure. Each sequence
consists of multiple periods. Your total earnings from a sequence will be the sum of
points you earn over the periods.
You will not know exactly how many periods there will be in a sequence until the
sequence ends. The number of periods is determined by the computer following a simple
rule: after each period, there is a 5% chance that the sequence ends and a 95% chance
the sequence continues.
In period one, the computer will randomly draw an offer from 1 to 1000 points. Every
offer is equally likely. Before you see the offer, you will be asked to choose a minimum
offer that you would be willing to accept. The computer will then accept the offer for
you if, and only if, it is above or equal to the minimum value you chose.
• If the offer is accepted, you earn that amount in period one and in every future
period of the sequence.
• If the offer is rejected, your earnings from period one will be 0 and, if the sequence
continues, you will receive a new offer in period two.
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In period two, if you accepted the offer in period one you do not have to make a
decision. Your earnings for the period will be equal to the offer you accepted in period
one. If you rejected the offer in period one, you will again be asked for the minimum
offer you would accept, and you will receive a new offer, which again will be accepted if
and only if it exceeds your minimum acceptable offer.
• If the offer is accepted you earn that amount in period two and in every future
period of the sequence.
• If the offer is rejected, your earnings from period two will be 0 and, if the sequence
continues, you will receive a new offer in period three.
This process will continue until the sequence ends. Remember there is a 95% chance
that the sequence continues, and a 5% chance that it ends, at the end of any period. At
the end of the sequence your earnings for the sequence will be the sum of your earnings
from each period in the sequence.
As long as you have not accepted an offer in the sequence, if the sequence continues
to the next period you will get a new offer. The new offer will be drawn independently
from the previous offers. This means in every period the offers from 1 to 1000 are equally
likely regardless of what offers were made previously.
In each period where you have to enter a minimum acceptable offer you are required
to enter it within 15 seconds. If you do not enter a minimum acceptable offer before the
time limit is reached, the computer will automatically reject the offer in that period. The
following examples illustrate how earnings are calculated.
Example 1:
The sequence lasts for 14 periods. A participant’s choice and the offers they draw are
listed as follows:
Period 1 2 · · · 14
Minimum acceptable offer 243 - · · · -
Offer 675 - · · · -
Period Income 675 675 · · · 675
In Period 1, the offer of 675 is drawn and exceeds the chosen minimum acceptable of-
fer, 243. Because this sequence lasts for 14 periods, the participant’s earning from the
sequence is 675*14 = 9,450 points.
Example 2:
The sequence lasts for 31 periods. A participant’s choices and the offers they draw are
listed as follows:
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Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 · · · 31
Minimum acceptable offer 455 770 61 531 916 380 - · · · -
Offer 279 208 15 66 106 564 - · · · -
Period Income 0 0 0 0 0 564 564 · · · 564
In the first five periods none of the offers are accepted because they are less than the
minimum acceptable offer. In Period 6, the offer of 564 is drawn and is accepted because
it exceeds the minimum acceptable offer of 380. Because there are still 31-5=26 periods
remaining in the sequence, the participant’s earning from the sequence is 564*(31-5) =
14,664 points.
Example 3:
The sequence lasts for 8 periods. A participant’s choices and the offers they draw are
listed as follows:
Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Minimum acceptable offer 655 818 138 927 700 322 877 427
Offer 525 51 67 823 659 285 525 225
Period Income 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
None of the offers are accepted because they are all less than the minimum acceptable
offer. Therefore the participant’s earning from the sequence is 0 points.
The numbers in these examples have been chosen just for illustrative purposes. In
the actual experiment, the computer will determine the number of periods in a sequence
(using the rule that at the end of a period there is a 5% chance the sequence stops and
a 95% chance the sequence continues). As long as you have not accepted an offer in the
sequence, the computer will also draw the offer in each period (each offer from 1 to 1000
is equally likely).
[Partner and Partner-Offer treatments only: In each sequence, you will be ran-
domly and anonymously paired with another participant. After the completion of each
sequence, participants in the room will be randomly re-paired so the people you are
paired with will change from sequence to sequence. In each sequence the person you are
paired with is also choosing whether to accept offers. The offers you and that participant
receive will be independent. This means you are equally likely to receive any offer from
1 to 1000, regardless of the other person’s offer. When the computer determines whether
to continue the sequence at the end of the period, it does this for both of you. That is,
if the sequence continues, it continues for both of you and if it stops it stops for both of
you.]
The minimum acceptable offer will be chosen by you in each period before an offer is
accepted. [Isolated treatment only: At the end of each period, you will observe your
offer and whether it is accepted (unless you already accepted an earlier offer). At the
end of every period, you will receive feedback on period income. You will also observe
your total income up to the period.] [Partner treatment only: At the end of every
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period, both you and the other participant will receive feedback on period income of both
you and that participant. Both of you will also be informed of any offers made in that
period and whether they were accepted. You will also observe your total income from
the sequence up to the period.] [Partner-Offer treatment only: At the end of every
period, both you and the other participant will receive feedback on period income of both
you and that participant. Both of you will also be informed of any offers made in that
period and whether they were accepted. You will also observe your total income from
the sequence up to the period.] The information will be displayed on the screen in the
following layout:
[Screenshots: Figure A1]
After the completion of each sequence, you will see the total number of periods, and
your total income from all the periods in the sequence.
At the end of experiment, one of the 10 sequences will be drawn and the total points
you earned in that sequence will be converted to cash as part of your payment.
Before we begin the decision-making part of the experiment we will ask some questions
to make sure you understand these instructions. Please look at you screen and follow the
instructions. If at any time you have a question raise your hand and someone will come





Figure A1: Screenshots for period feedback
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Control questions
[*] indicates differences across treatments.
1. What is the probability that the computer will offer you more than 500 in Period 1
of a round?
- Lower than 50%
- Exactly 50%
- Higher than 50%
(Message if a wrong answer is selected: “The answer you picked is incorrect; the offer
is drawn from 1, 2 to 1000 with equal probability, so in each period the probability of
getting an offer larger than 500 is exactly 50%.”)
2. Suppose in the Period 1 you rejected an offer of 233. What is the probability that
the computer will offer you more than 500 in Period 2?
- Lower than 50%
- Exactly 50%
- Higher than 50%
(Message if a wrong answer is selected: “The answer you picked is incorrect; the offers
you get are independently drawn, so the probability of getting an offer larger than 500
in Period 2 is exactly 50%.”)
3. Suppose you accepted an offer of 879 in Period 1, what is the probability that the
round will continue to Period 2?
- Lower than 95%
- Exactly 95%
- Higher than 95%
(Message if a wrong answer is selected: “The answer you picked is incorrect; the prob-
ability the round will continue to Period 2 is exactly 95%. At the end of every period
there is a 5% chance the round stops and a 95% chance the round continues.”)
4. Suppose you rejected an offer of 435 in Period 10, what is the probability that the
round will continue to Period 11?
- Lower than 95%
- Exactly 95%
- Higher than 95%
(Message if a wrong answer is selected: “The answer you picked is incorrect; after Period
10, the probability that the round will continue to Period 11 is exactly 95%. At the
end of every period there is a 5% chance the round stops and a 95% chance the round
continues.”)
5. In periods 1-3, the minimum acceptable offer and received offers of a participant are
listed in the following table:
44
Period 1 2 3 · · ·
Minimum acceptable offer 891 850 620 · · ·
Offer 383 777 643 · · ·




(Message if a wrong answer is selected: “The answer you picked is incorrect; the partic-
ipant has accepted the offer in Period 3, which is the first period that the offer received
exceeds the minimum acceptable offer.”)
[Peer and Peer-Offer treatments only:
6. Suppose in Period 1 your offer is 698, what is the probability that your paired partic-
ipant’s offer is larger than 500 in the same period?
- Lower than 50%
- Exactly 50%
- Higher than 50%
(Message if a wrong answer is selected: “The answer you picked is incorrect; the offers you
and your paired participant get are independent, so for them the probability of getting a
number larger than 500 is exactly 50%.”)]
7. The experiment will consist of 10 sequences. After the completion of the experiment,
how many sequence(s) will be drawn to determine the payoffs of the participants?
- Only one
- More than one
- The number of sequences is randomly determined by the computer
(Message if a wrong answer is selected: “The answer you picked is incorrect; only ONE
out of 10 sequences will be drawn to determine the payoff of the participants. ”)
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Appendix B Theoretical Analysis
B.1 Basic setup
We describe a simple job-search model based on McCall (1970). An infinitely-lived job-
seeker makes decisions and receives income over a sequence of discrete time periods.
While searching the job-seeker draws one wage offer w per period from a bounded
wage distribution F (w). Offers are independently drawn across periods. If the job-seeker
rejects the offer their income is zero in that period and they continue search. If the
job-seeker accepts the offer, they exit search and receive w for the current and all future
periods. In the baseline case we assume that the period utility is
ut = yt, where yt =
{
w if offer w has been drawn and accepted,
0 otherwise.
We assume the job-seeker maximizes the expected discounted sum of period utilities:
∞∑
t=0
δtE[ut], 0 < δ < 1
Since the environment is stationary, the optimal strategy can be expressed as a constant
reservation wage r, i.e. in any period, the job-seeker accepts if offered at least the
reservation wage, and continues to search otherwise. The job-seeker’s objective function
can be written as a function of the reservation wage, V (r). With probability F (r) the
job-seeker rejects the offer, earns zero in the current period and faces an identical decision
problem in the next period (and hence gets δV (r)). With probability 1 − F (r) the job-
seeker accepts the offer and earns the offered amount in all future periods. Thus,
V (r) = F (r)(0 + δV (r)) + (1− F (r)) 1
1− δ
E[w|w ≥ r],









For a given offer distribution this can be used to solve the optimization problem directly.
For ease of exposition, in the remainder of the discussion we assume that the wage offer
follows a uniform distribution over [0, 1], F (w) = w. Then (1) is maximized with a unique







For a discount factor δ = 0.95, this implies an optimal reservation wage of r∗ = 0.724. For
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our experiment with wage offers following a discrete uniform distribution on {1, · · · , 1000},
the optimal reservation wage is 725.
B.2 Distributional preferences
Now suppose that there are two job-seekers, indexed by i ∈ {1, 2}, who are “partners”
in the sense that they perform the same sequential search task simultaneously, with
wage offers being independent draws across job-seekers and periods. The job-seekers are
informed of each other’s income at the end of each period. We assume that the job-seekers
make interpersonal comparisons in each period of search. Specifically, following Fehr &
Schmidt (1999), we assume that i dislikes income differences, as represented by the period
utility function (where yit denotes i’s period t income and yjt denotes the period t income
of i’s partner)
uit(yit, yjt) = yit − α
(




max{yit, yjt} − yjt
)
(3)
The assumptions made in Fehr & Schmidt (1999) are that 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 and α ≥ β. We
retain the assumption that utility is evaluated each period, including the distaste for
inequality, and i seeks to maximize
∞∑
t=0
δtE[uit], 0 < δ < 1 (4)
This extends the individual choice problem of Section B.1 to a game.
Our solution concept is that of Markov Perfect Equilibrium. A Markov strategy for job-
seeker i is (ri0, ri(y)), an initial reservation wage ri0 that governs i’s acceptance decision
when both partners are active job-seekers, and a reservation wage function ri(y) that
governs i’s acceptance decision when she is actively searching but the partner has already
accepted an offer and obtains period income y. A Markov Perfect Equilibrium is a pair
of Markov strategies (r∗i0, r∗i (y)), i = 1, 2, such that,
1. For each i, r∗i (y) maximizes (4) given partner j is inactive with period income y.
2. For each i, r∗i0 maximizes (4) given partner j is active using strategy (r∗j0, r∗j (y)),
and i will revert to r∗i (y) if j exits with period income y.
We start by calculating r∗i (y) and then find r∗i0 using backward induction.
B.2.1 Optimal reservation wage for active job-seeker after partner exits
Consider the case that i is still searching and j has exited with a wage (and hence a
per-period income) of yjt = y. Again the dynamic problem facing i is stationary, and so
the optimal reservation wage is constant.
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Using a constant reservation wage ri, i’s expected discounted utility beginning from
a period in which j is inactive with period income y is denoted by VA(ri; y). With
probability ri the offer is rejected (w < ri) , which gives the current period utility of
−αy and a discounted future value of δVA(ri; y), and with probability 1− ri, the offer is
accepted (w ≥ ri), which yields a constant period utility in all future periods. Thus,
VA(ri; y) = ri(ui(0, y) + δVA(ri; y)) + (1− ri)
1
1− δ



























(w− β(w− y)) dw
))
,
where k ≡ max{ri, y}.
This is maximized by r∗i (y),
r∗i (y) = max












Equation (5) describes the optimal reservation wage for a job-seeker (with given α, β
and δ) after their partner has exited search with period income y. When α = β = 0 this
reduces to (2) and the reservation wage is independent of the partner’s income. For other
values of α, β, 0 < r∗i (y) ≤ r∗. For y = 0 or 1 the optimal reservation wage is r∗. For
y < ŷ, r∗i (y) is decreasing in y. For y > ŷ, r∗i (y) is increasing in y.
We use VA(y) to denote the value of the game to i beginning from a period in which




i (y); y). (6)
B.2.2 Optimal initial reservation wage when both job-seekers are active
Now we move on to find the equilibrium initial reservation wage. Job-seeker i’s expected
discounted utility beginning from a period in which both job-seekers are active is a func-
tion of their initial reservation wages V0(ri0, rj0). The period has four possible outcomes:
neither of the job-seekers accept their offers, i accepts and j rejects, j accepts and i
rejects, or both of the job-seekers accept. Thus V0(ri0, rj0) can be written as the sum of
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When neither accepts, i receives current period utility of zero and in the next period
begins a subgame which is identical to the original game. When i accepts and j rejects,
i’s current period utility is ui(yi, 0), and we denote by VI(yi) (subscript I for “inactive”)
the value of the game to i beginning from a period in which she is inactive with period
income yi and the partner is active. When i rejects and j accepts and earns period income
yj, i’s current period utility is ui(0, yj), and the value of the game to i from the beginning
of the next period is VA(yj). Finally, when both i and j accept their offers in the current
period i gets utility ui(yi, yj) in this and every future period.






































Note that VI(yi) depends on both job-seeker’s preferences (and i’s belief about j’s
preferences), so identifying the equilibrium initial reservation wage requires assumptions
about both job-seekers’ preferences and what job-seekers know about each other’s pref-
erences. For tractability, we assume job-seekers have identical preferences and this is
common knowledge.






ui(yi, 0) + δVI(yi)
)
+ (1− r∗j (yi))
1
1− δ
E[ui(yi, w)|w ≥ r∗j (yi)],
























(1− r∗i (yi))yi − α
∫ 1
l







Combining (5), (6), (7) and (8), we complete the initial objective function V0 for i. We
conduct a calibration to find the optimal response function for i given j’s choice, r∗i0(rj0).
We calibrate r∗i0 for all (α, β), α ∈ [0, 2), β ∈ [0, 1), and α > β with grid equal to 0.01.
The results are accurate to the third decimal place.
The simulation shows that the equilibrium r∗i0 is close to the expected own-earning-
maximizing r∗. For the majority of (α, β), r∗0 is slightly below r∗, although for small α
and small β it is slightly above r∗ (Figure B1a).
The initial equilibrium reservation wage r∗i0 lies above the kink point of the r∗i (y)
function, ŷ. This implies that a job-seeker never accepts a wage below ŷ (Figure B1b)
and so in equilibrium only the positively-sloped part of r∗i (·) is relevant in Figure 1.
B.2.3 Summary and implications
After a partner exits, the model predicts that the remaining job-seeker selects a constant
reservation wage that depends on the partner’s income (see Figure 1). Since the initial
reservation wage lies above the kink point, only the upward sloping portion is relevant
in equilibrium. Therefore the model predicts a positive relationship between the wage
accepted by the partner and the reservation wage of the remaining job-seeker. In most
cases, the change in reservation wage in response to partner’s exit is negative, but the
size of the change is moderated by the exit offer of the partner. Note that although
we only report the calibration with standard Fehr-Schmidt assumptions, this qualitative
prediction can be extended to negative βs, as long as −α < β.
These results have three practical implications for job search outcomes. First, the
probability that a job-seeker exits in period t depends positively on whether their partner
exited in period t− 1. In our setting, the probability of exiting is 1−F (r) = 1− r, which
changes from (1−r∗0) before the partner exits to (1−r∗(y)) after the partner exits with y.
The expected change is r∗0 −E[r∗(y)|y ≥ r∗0]. Before the partner exits, the probability of
exiting is about 28%, and the expected increase in the probability of exiting after partner
exits varies from about 3% for high values of α and β to 1% for low values. The expected
changes for five sets of (α, β) are reported in column (1) of Table B1.
Second, there is a “spillover” from the partner’s exit wage to the remaining job-seeker’s
reservation wage. A job-seeker whose partner has exited with a high wage has a higher




















































(b) Comparison of r∗0
with kink-point: r∗0 − ŷ
Figure B1: Equilibrium initial reservation wage for different Fehr-Schmidt parameters
Notes: β ∈ [0, 1), α ∈ [0, 2), α ≥ β; r∗ = 0.724. The equilibrium r∗i0 lies between 0.717 and
0.726 for all (α, β). In the calibrated range of (α, β), r∗i0 takes its minimum at (1.99, 0.91)
and maximum at (0.24, 0.06). (r∗i0 − ŷ) is always positive, and takes its minimum of 0.003 at
(0.01, 0.01) and maximum of 0.687 at (1.99, 0.99).
an initial reservation wage of r∗0, the exit wage varies uniformly between r∗0 and 1. The
reservation wage of the active job-seeker then varies from r∗(r∗0) to r∗(1). The difference
between r∗(1) and r∗(r∗0) varies from 0.10 for high α and β to 0.04 for low α and β. Column
(2) of Table B1 reports the slope of the linearized relationship between the partner’s exit
wage and the remaining job-seeker’s reservation wage, which shows that a unit increase
in y leads to a linearized increase in r∗ of 0.35 for high and 0.13 for low α and β.
Third, this implies a correlation of wages across partners. By definition, independent
job-seekers’ wages are uncorrelated. In contrast, inequity averse job-seekers who are
partners will have positively correlated wages, if they exit in sequence. The correlation
is 0.13 for high α and β and 0.05 for low α and β (column(3) of Table B1).
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r∗(y) and y, y ≥ r∗0 :
Correlation between
exit wages:





(0, 0) 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.5, 0.0) 0.013 0.132 0.046
(0.5, 0.5) 0.024 0.253 0.100
(0.9, 0.6) 0.027 0.297 0.110
(1.0, 0.8) 0.029 0.336 0.129
(2.0, 0.8) 0.028 0.349 0.130
a Based on calibration of 100,000 pairs.
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Appendix C Additional descriptives































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Search spell length
(c) Partner-Offer treatment
Notes: 125 search spells which are censored by the end of the sequence are excluded.
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Table C1: Sample for analysing within-sequence reference wage effects
(1) (2) (3)
Isolated Partner Partner-Offer Total
Total 1,576 1,588 1,585 4,749
Excluded observations:
First period 720 720 720 2,160
Timed out 1 1 6 8
Partner exited 353 289 268 910
Sample 502 578 591 1,671
Table C2: Sample for analysing between-sequence learning effects
(1) (2) (3)
Isolated Partner Partner-Offer Total
Total 720 720 720 2,160
Excluded observations:
First sequence 72 72 72 216
Timed out 1 0 3 4
Censored (i or j) 66 68 50 184
Sample 581 580 595 1,756
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Appendix D Additional results
Table D1: Alternative specifications for Table 4
(1) (2) (3)
Isolated Partner Partner-Offer
β1 j accepted offer (aj) −5.577 −6.759 −8.913 −71.029∗∗ −69.019∗ −71.662∗∗ −58.712∗∗∗ −61.161∗∗∗ −59.495∗∗∗
(22.585) (22.234) (22.803) (33.712) (38.390) (35.521) (17.223) (16.297) (19.022)
β2 j’s income (ajoj) 0.007 0.009 0.010 0.094∗∗ 0.088∗ 0.092∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.033) (0.034) (0.047) (0.052) (0.049) (0.025) (0.022) (0.029)
β3 value of j’s offer (oj) 0.002 −0.001 0.000 −0.008 −0.001 −0.006 −0.002 −0.001 −0.002
(0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
Subject random effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Sequence fixed effects Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
Subject characteristics No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Number of obs. 510 510 510 578 578 578 591 591 591
Number of sessions 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
Table D2: Estimates of the sequence trends
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Period 1 (ris1) Exit period (risL)
Isolated 3.733 3.732 4.078∗∗∗ 4.083∗∗∗
(2.555) (2.559) (1.293) (1.294)
Partner 9.538∗∗∗ 9.540∗∗∗ 12.926∗∗∗ 12.904∗∗∗
(1.883) (1.886) (2.235) (2.239)
Partner-Offer 6.333∗∗ 6.328∗∗ 7.663∗∗∗ 7.659∗∗∗
(2.875) (2.877) (2.463) (2.466)
p-values for
Partner vs. Isolated 0.067 0.068 0.001 0.001
Partner-Offer vs. Isolated 0.499 0.500 0.197 0.199
Partner vs. Partner-Offer 0.351 0.350 0.113 0.115
Subject random effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Subject characteristics No Yes No Yes
Number of obs. 2,155 2,155 2,035 2,035
Notes: The sequence trends for each treatment are estimated using the
following model:
rist = β0+β1Partneri+β2Partner-Offeri+β3s+β4s×Partneri+β5s×
Partner-Offeri + ηi + ϵist,
where t is period 1 or the last period. The sample for column (1) and (2)
excludes 5 sequences in which the subject timed out for the initial period.
The sample for column (3) and (4) excludes 135 censored sequences.
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